Abstract. A recent trend in cryptography is to protect data and computation against various side-channel attacks. Dziembowski and Faust (TCC 2012) have proposed a general way to protect arbitrary circuits against any continual leakage assuming that: (i) the memory is divided into the parts, which leaks independently (ii) the leakage in each observation is bounded (iii) the circuit has an access to a leak-free component, which samples random orthogonal vectors. The pivotal element of their construction is a protocol for refreshing the so-called Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS). In this note, we present a more efficient and simpler protocol for refreshing LRS under the same assumptions. Our solution needs O(n) operations to fully refresh the secret (in comparison to Ω(n 2 ) for a protocol of Dziembowski and Faust), where n is a security parameter that describes the maximal amount of leakage in each invocation of the refreshing procedure.
Introduction
A leakage-resilient cryptography has been intensively studied in the recent years (cf. for instance [MR04, DP08, FKPR10, GR10, DHLAW10, BKKV10, LLW11, DF11, DF12, GR12]). This note is based on a work by Dziembowski and Faust [DF12] . It follows the assumptions, construction and notation from the mentioned work. We briefly review the settings, for the complete description of the model we refer the reader to [DF12] .
We first start with the definition of the Leakage-Resilient Storage (LRS) [DDV10], which is a randomized encoding scheme (Enc : M → L × R, Dec : L×R → M), resilient to leakage in the following sense. Let m ∈ M be a message, and let (l, r) := Enc(m). Then, an adversary that learns some partial information f (l) about l and (independently) g(r) about r should gain no information about the encoded message m. The idea is to keep l and r on the different memory parts, which leak independently. We will model that setting assuming that they are kept be different parties, which can perform computation and exchange messages.
More precisely (citing verbatim [DF12] ), for some c, ℓ, λ ∈ N let M 1 , . . . , M ℓ ∈ {0, 1} c denote the contents of the memory parts, then we define a λ-leakage game played between an adaptive adversary A, called a λ-limited leakage adversary, and a leakage oracle Ω(M 1 , . . . , M ℓ ) as follows. For some m ∈ N, the adversary A can adaptively issue a sequence {(
of requests to the oracle Ω(M 1 , . . . , M ℓ ), where x i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and f i : {0, 1} c → {0, 1} λi with λ i ≤ λ. To each such a query the oracle replies with f i (M xi ) and we say that in this case the adversary A retrieved the value f i (M xi ) from M xi . The only restriction is that in total the adversary does not retrieve more than λ bits from each memory part. In the following, let (A ⇄ (M 1 , . . . , M ℓ )) be the output of A at the end of this game.
An LRS Φ is said to be (λ, ǫ)-secure, if for any S, S ′ ∈ M and any λ-limited
is based of the inner-product extractor. A secret S ∈ F (where F is an arbitrary finite field) is encoded using two random vectors L, R ∈ F n , such that S = L, R . In this note we only allow the encodings such that L, R ∈ (F \ {0})
n . Moreover, we will assume that F is fairly large in comparison to n, that is |F| ≥ 4n. Dziembowski and Faust [DF12] showed the following lemma.
Dziembowski and Faust [DF12] have proposed a compiler, which transforms arbitrary circuits over F into functionally equivalent circuits secure against any continual leakage assuming that:
1. the memory is divided into the parts, which leak independently, 2. the leakage from each memory part is bounded, 3. the circuit has an access to a leak-free component, which samples random orthogonal vectors.
A pivotal point in the construction is the Refresh n F protocol, which refreshes the encoding of the secret. It is run by two parties P L holding L and P R holding R. At the end of the protocol P L outputs L ′ and
is uniform and independent of (L, R). The only fact about Refresh n F , which is used in the security proof presented in [DF12] is the existence of the reconstructor procedure (an idea introduced earlier in [FRR + 10]). Informally, the reconstructor is a protocol that for inputs
′ allows the parties to reconstruct the views that they would have in the Refresh
It is there used in a "generalized multiplication" protocol as a sub-routine, what leads at the end to O(n 4 ) blow-up of the circuit's size while securing it against leakages. The protocol presented in this note needs O(n) operations to refresh the secret, what leads to O(n 2 ) blow-up of the circuit's size.
Similarly as in [DF12] we assume that the players have access to a leak-free component that samples uniformly random pairs of orthogonal vectors. Technically, we will assume that we have an oracle O ′ that samples a uniformly random vector ((A,Ã), (B,B)) ∈ (F n ) 4 , subject to the constraint that the following three conditions hold:
Note that although our oracle is slightly different from the oracle O used in [DF12] , it may be easily "simulated" by the players having access to O.
The refreshing scheme is presented in Figure 1 . The general idea behind the protocol is similar to one, which appeared in [DF12] . Denote α := A, B (= − Ã ,B ). The Steps 2 and 3 are needed to refresh the share of P R . This is done by generating, with the "help" of (A, B) (coming from O ′ ) a vector X such that
The key difference between our approach and the protocol from [DF12] is a new and more efficient way of generating such X. Eq. (1) comes from a summation:
Then, vector X is added to the share of P R by setting (in Step 3)
Symmetrically, in Steps 5 and 6 the players refresh the share of P L , by first generatingX such that X , R ′ = −α, and then setting L ′ = L +X. By similar reasoning as before, we get
3 Reconstructor for Refresh n F
We now show a reconstructor for the Refresh n F protocol. Informally, the reconstructor is a protocol that for inputs (L, L ′ ) held by P L and (R,
The key feature of this reconstructor is that it does not require any interaction between the players. The only "common randomness" that the players need can be sampled offline before the protocol starts. These properties are used in a security proof presented in [DF12] .
We now formalize what it means that ReconstructRefresh n F is a reconstructor for Refresh n F . This is done by considering two experiments depicted on Fig. 3 . The next lemma shows that these experiments produce the same distributions.
n is given to P L and R ∈ (F \ {0}) n is given to P R .
Let ((A,Ã), (B,B)) ← O
′ and give (A,Ã) to P L and (B,B) to P R .
Refreshing the share of P R :
2. The player P L computes a vector V such that Vi := L −1 i · Ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and sends V to P R . 3. The player P R computes a vector X such that Xi := Vi · Bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and sets R ′ := R + X. Refreshing the share of P L :
5. The player P R computes a vectorṼ such thatṼi := R Output: The players output (L ′ , R ′ ). Views: The view view L of player P L is (L, A, V,Ã,Ṽ ) and the view view R of player P R is (R, B, V,B,Ṽ ).
Note that the inverses in Steps 2 and 5 always exist, because L, R ∈ (F \ {0}) n . Steps 4 and 7 guarantee that this condition is preserved under the execution of the protocol Refresh n F . It can be easily proven that the protocol is restarted with a bounded probability regardless of n (but keeping |F| ≥ 4n), so it changes the efficiency of the algorithm only by a constant factor.
n are given to PL and R, R ′ ∈ (F \ {0}) n are given to PR. Offline sampling: Vectors V andṼ are independently and uniformly sampled from (F \ {0}) n and given to both players.
Reconstructing the "Refreshing the share of PR" phase:
1. The player PL computes a vector A such that Ai := Vi · Li for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 2. The player PR sets X := R ′ − R and computes a vector B such that Bi := V
Reconstructing the "Refreshing the share of PL" phase: 3. The player PR computes a vectorB such thatBi :=Ṽi · R 
Proof. We only show that the equality of distributions holds for the variables involved in the "Refreshing of the share of P R phase" (the same fact for the other phase is proven analogously). These variables are L, R, A, B, V, X, R ′ .
We prove it showing that each of the above variables has an identical conditional distribution given the previous variables in the series:
1. L, R: Clearly in both experiments (L, R) is constant and identical; 2. A: A is uniformly distributed over (F \ {0}) n independently of (L, R). In the first experiment it comes from the way it is sampled from O ′ . In the second scenario it is defined by the equation
A i is a product of V i distributed uniformly over (F \ {0}) and some fixed non-zero L i . Therefore A i has a uniform distribution over (F \ {0}). 3. B: B is uniformly distributed over F n independently of (L, R, A). In the first experiment it comes from the way it is sampled from O ′ . In the second scenario it is defined by the equation B i := V −1 i · X i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Notice that R ′ has a uniform distribution over F n independent of (L, R, A), so X defined by X := R ′ − R is also uniform over F. Hence, each B i is a product of some non-zero V i ·A i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Step 2 in Fig. 1 and Step 1 in Fig. 2 ). 5. X: X is uniquely determined given (L, R, A, B, V ) by the equation X i = V i · B i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Step 3 in Fig. 1 and Step 2 in Fig. 2 ). 6. R ′ : R ′ is in both experiments equal to L + X. ⊓ ⊔
